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enetically modified (GM) agricultural crops such as cotton, maize, or soybeans
have been planted widely by farmers since 1995 in three western hemisphere
countries—the United States, Argentina, and Canada. Where GM crops have
been planted they have performed as advertised, allowing farmers to reduce
costs by controlling insects and weeds with fewer, less toxic, and less persistent chemicals.
Yet the planting of GM crops has not spread significantly beyond these three coun-
tries, which still account for roughly 98 percent of total GM crop acreage worldwide. It is
perhaps understandable that GM crops have not made inroads into Europe or Japan, where
consumers are well fed, farmers are prosperous without GM crops, and where green
parties and anti-globalization nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) promote a highly
precautionary approach to food safety and environmental protection. But why haven’t
more developing countries begun planting GM crops? In poor countries many farmers are
far from being fully productive and many citizens must worry more about food availability
or food cost than about unconfirmed food safety dangers. In poor countries the develop-
ment imperative ordinarily trumps issues of environmental precaution. So why has a
pattern of policy resistance to GM crops emerged instead?
In this original study Robert Paarlberg examines local policy responses to GM crop
technologies in four important developing countries: Brazil, India, Kenya, and China. He
shows that in the first three of these countries regulatory authorities have not yet given
farmers official permission to plant any GM crops. And in China, where farmers have
been permitted to plant GM cotton, regulators are still holding back on the release of most
GM food and feed crops, even though China’s own national agricultural research system
has invested a considerable effort in developing such crops. This degree of governmental
precaution regarding the release of GM crops for planting is actually greater than in
Europe or Japan, where unofficial consumer resistance rather than a lack of official regu-
latory approval has held up the planting of GM crops. 
The explanation for this official caution toward GM crops in the developing world is
complex. In some cases (Kenya) the caution grows partly out of a weak national capacity
to test GM crops for all possible local biosafety risks. Despite this weak capacity, the
international donor community—pushed by environmental NGOs—has insisted that GM
crops  not  be  introduced  into  poor  countries  until  regulations,  facilities,  and  trained
personnel are in place to permit thorough case-by-case biosafety screening. Many poor
countries do now have the regulations, but few have the facilities, trained personnel, or
budgetary resources. In such countries, rather than be caught failing to measure up to
their own announced biosafety standards, regulators often decide to err on the side of not
granting any GM crop approvals.
In other cases (Brazil and India) the non-approval of GM crops has been a direct result
of media campaigns and direct actions by local and international NGOs (such as Green-
peace) opposed to GM crops. National regulatory authorities have been blocked from
giving commercial release to GM crops by court actions challenging the constitutional
authority of national biosafety committees, or they have been deterred from moving ahead
by NGO acts—such as attacks on crop field trials—designed to create social and media
resistance to GM crops and foods.
In still other cases (China), the release of GM food and feed crops has recently been
slowed in part by anxieties regarding consumer acceptance abroad. Regulators working
in China’s more tightly controlled political system have had less to fear from domestic
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media criticism or actions by NGOs
and partly as a result they have been
able to approve and promote the pro-
duction of an important GM industrial
crop, Bt cotton. Yet partly for fear of
losing  access  to  export  markets  in
Asia or Europe, these same Chinese
regulators have decided so far not to
approve  the  commercial  planting  of
GM feed or food crops such as maize
or  rice.  Anxiety  about  the  future
acceptance  of  GM  crops  in  export
markets  is  also  a  growing  factor  in
Brazil’s policymaking process.
This study shows that it is usually
in the name of biosafety that govern-
ments  in  the  developing  world  have
acted to slow the commercial release
of GM crops, even though biological
safety has traditionally been no more
than  a  secondary  concern  in  these
countries,  and  even  though  the  GM
crops being screened may present no
documented biosafety threat. National
biosafety  authorities  in  Kenya  have
not yet approved the planting of virus-
resistant sweetpotatoes on grounds of
biological safety, despite the fact that
unwanted  geneflow  from  this  crop
does  not  pose  a  danger  in  Kenya
because there are no wild relatives of
the sweetpotato in Africa and because
the  crop  is  propagated  vegatatively.
Herbicide-tolerant soybeans are being
held up on biosafety grounds in Brazil
even though there are no wild relatives
of  the  soybean  anywhere  in  the
Western Hemisphere and even though
most of the known effects of planting
this GM variety on the biological envi-
ronment tend to be positive (including
the use of fewer, less toxic, and less per-
sistent herbicides). Developing coun-
try  governments  are  using  biosafety
regulations to go slow on GM crops
even in cases where biological safety
is not the true concern.
This study also shows that inter-
national constraints on the use of intel-
lectual property have not been a prin-
ciple reason so far for the slow spread
of GM crops to the developing world.
In some cases (Kenya) corporate intel-
lectual  property  rights  (IPR)  holders
have been willing to share the rights to
their GM technologies free of charge
for use on noncommercial food crops
such as sweetpotatoes grown in the de-
veloping world. In other cases (India)
corporations  have  protected  them-
selves against loss of IPR by incorpo-
rating their valuable transgenic tech-
nologies into hybrid crops, which do
not keep their desirable traits beyond
a single planting. In still other cases
(China) corporations have brought in
valuable GM seeds despite the pros-
pect of significant local piracy, as a way
to begin at least some commercial GM
seed  sales  in  a  large  and  potentially
lucrative developing-world market.
A larger constraint on the success-
ful  introduction  of  useful  GM  crops
into  the  developing  world  has  been
low spending by national governments
on  biotechnology  research.  Larger
investments in GM crop research by
national agricultural research systems
(NARS) would have several benefits.
They would steer GM crop develop-
ment  more  often  in  the  direction  of
poor  people’s  crops,  which  tend  to
be  neglected  by  private  corporate
research. A larger NARS role would
also  help  relieve  anxieties  regarding
the dominant role that some powerful
multinational seed and chemical com-
panies  have  recently  assumed  in  the
promotion of GM crops. GM crop crit-
ics  in  the  developing  world  have  an
easy  time  blocking  this  technology
when it is brought in from abroad by
widely  mistrusted  foreign  multina-
tional corporations. If the technology
were seen emerging instead from sci-
entists  working  for  national  devel-
opment  purposes  within  publicly  fi-
nanced  national  laboratories,  local
political  resistance  could  diminish.
China  has  been  willing  to  go  ahead
with Bt cotton in part because some of
the varieties now being planted were
locally developed within that nation’s
own agricultural research system.
It is still too early to judge how far
the planting of GM crops will eventu-
ally spread in the developing world.
Yet it is somewhat discouraging at this
point to see in so many cases that the
most  important  local  stakeholders—
poor farmers with families to feed—
have not yet been given official per-
mission to use this important new tool
for raising farm productivity.